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Standing at a Crossroad 
of American Pragmatism and Postmodermsm 
Isono Arai 
I Open to Discussion: An Introduction 
We live in an age when dogma or theory is tempted to claim more for 
itself. Dogma-centered ideology is always dangerous, because all theory is 
designed to fit the purpose at hand, and it tends to dismiss the pleasure of 
the reading experience, and constructs a closed system. I need some 
qualifications and nuance here. Some theories, Iike deconstruction, are open 
ended. However, they also repeat themselves. 
Contemporary interest in ideology has no development and is related to 
slippage in the term itself. "Ideology" refers to everything from ideas in the 
service of power to complex semiotic systems that are designed to provide 
boundaries. Ideology is concealed in the fact that ideological form creates 
nothing more than a set of ideological closed formations, though sometimes, 
ideology leads to action. We are imprisoned within ideology, as if there 
were nowhere beyond ideology. There are two questions I would like to 
consider: 
1. Is evel~ything political, ideological and dogmatic? 
2. Can we totalize, essentialize, universalize everything? 
During the period of the American Renaissance, Ralph Waldo Emerson 
transcended Ideology by definlng the boundless realm of spiritual quest. 
William James says that "Rationallsm Is always monlstrc " whlle 
"Empiricism starts from the parts, and makes of the whole a collection" and 
it "is not averse therefore to calling Itself pluralistic," and, therefore, that " 
[theJ rationalist finally will be of dogmatic temper in his affirmations, 
while the empiricist may be more sceptical and open to discussion."I I shall 
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adopt the attitude of Jamesian empiricism, and be "open to discussion." 
Pragmatism maintains a position that it is healthier to keep looking for 
and making up new stories than it is to insist that all of our experience 
must be encompassed wlthin the structures and tensions of one single story. 
In other words, pragmatism asks us to question what we think the world of 
experience affords. 
In this ideological age, pragmatism may afford the possibility of 
thinking the world from a perspective that is beyond ideology. I would like 
to approach American Pragmatism as a way of thinking, and try to find 
some paradigm in it. 
~ Siein, Jame~, and Rorty 
Rlchard Polrrel focuses on pragmatism as a form of linguistic 
skepticism: "the democratic i.mpulse shared by Emersonian pragmatists also 
involved a recognition that language, if it is to represent the flow of 
individual experience, ceases to be an instrument of clarification or of 
clarity and, instead, becomes the instrument of a saving uncertainty and 
vagueness 2 Vagueness and uncertainty generated by linguistic skepticism 
??
alludes to the chaos of language, the Tower of Babel. Poirier argues that 
"Emersonian linguistic skepticism" is equally at work, and he examines it as 
a "generative princlple" in such American poets as Emlly Dickinson, Robert 
Frost, Wallace Stevens, Gertrude Stein, and Walt Whitman. As to the 
vagueness of Emersonian linguistic skepticism, Poirier finds it as "the 
deconstructive moments of language" in the dialogue of Melanctha and Jeff 
in Stein's Three Lives. 
Here I would like to concretely take up some of Stein's literary works, 
and to show my reading experience of them, keeping in mind not to close 
the text by any dogma or icleology. How do we contextualize Stein's text? 
Reading an avant-garde modernist, Gertrude Stein, in a pragmatic 
context, as a reader in the 1990s, who lives in an avant-pop condition of the 
arts, and who is interested in postmodernism, requil~es me to read Gertrude 
Stein in a post-pragmatic avant-pop modernistic way of reading.3 
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A. "Composition as Explanation" 
I wlll discuss a noveletbe "Melanctha," and a lecture essay, 
"Composltion as Explanation." The relationship between "Melanctha" and 
"Composrtron as Explanation" seems to be slnular to the relationship 
between Edgar Allan Poe s poem "The Raven" and Its self analysls 
"Philosophy of Composition." Stein says: 
In beginning writing I wrote a bool{ called Three I*ives this was written in 
1905. I wrote a negro story callecl Melanctha. In that there was a constant 
recurring and beginning there was a mal~ked direction in the direction of 
being in the present although naturally i had been accustomed to past present 
and future, and why, because the composition forming around me was a 
prolonged present.4 
The essay "Composrtron as Explanation" Is structured around a few motlfs 
or keywords, "composrtion," "time-sense" of "a continuous present," "uslng 
everything," and "beglnnlng agaln." These motifs are explalned, or, 1~ather, 
Stein repeats these "words" many times in a playful manner: 
I~egil4nil4g again and agail~ a7cd again explaining composition and time is a 
natural thing. 
It is understood by this time that everything is the same except composition 
and time, composition and the time of the composition and the time in the 
com posi tion . 
Everythil4g is the same except composition and as the compositiow is different 
and always going to be different evervthi74g is not the same. Everything is not 
the same as the time when of the composition and the time in the compositiole is 
different. The composition is different, that is certain.5 (emphases mine) 
Moreover, 
Ilere again it was all so natural to me and more and more complicatedly a 
continuous present. A continuous present is a continuous presenl. I made almost 
thousand pages of a continuous present. Colltinu,ous present is one thing and 
beginning again and again is another thing. These are both things. And then 
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there is usileg everything. 
This brings us again to composition this the usil4g everything. The usil4g 
everything brings us to compositi014 and to this composition. A c014til4uous present 
and usill;g everythil4g and begilening again. In these two books L Three Lives 
and The Mahing of Americal4s] there was elaboration of the complexities of 
usil4g everything and of a contileuou;s preselet and of begilenileg again and again 
alrd again . 
In the first book there was a groping for a continuous present and for using 
everythil4g by begil414ing agail~ and agail4 alrd agailc. 
There was a groping for usil4g everything and there was a groping for a 
contirtuous present and there was an inevitable beginning of begil~ning agail~ 
and again alrd agail4.6 (emphases mine) 
On the one hand, the entire essay is devoted to exploring and 
communicating the meaning of the motifs; but, on the other hand, Stein 
seems to be enjoying a language game by repeatedly writing the key words 
on the pages. Consequently, these words turn out of be the keywords in the 
essay. Stein tales these words up, elaborates them from various angles, puts 
them aside temporarily, then takes them up again, in the same manner as 
her writing of "Melanctha." 
B. "Melanctha" 
The "Melanctha" story is stylized through the increasingly consistent 
use of repeated words and sentences. The refrains bring us back every time 
we seem to move forward in the text. Stein labels this intensive duration of 
a dramatically flattened moment the "continuous present" in the essay, 
"Composrtron and Explanation." There she recognizes the experimental style 
of "Melanctha," as I have mentioned above. 
Stein stylizes repetition, the narrative strategy that secures the unity 
and integrity of any narrative by binding beginning and ending, and makes 
excessive, and therefore manifest, a narrative element that is usually kept 
discreet. She stylizes the beginning, and by beginning again and again and 
again, she differs from her previous conclusions and thus defers an ultimate 
one. Consequently, the vocabulary is rather limited. In other words, the 
number of words is multiplied. This amplification is achieved by the 
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repeated use of names or insistent qualifying phrases. The repetition of 
words impedes the progress of the discourse. The rather simple vocabulary 
is often used to covel~ over many things. At the same time, certain words, 
phrases, and sentences become emblematic, taking on the shape of a mise-en-
abime. They invoke open-ended, complex meanings and associations, and 
they remain vague. 
Poirier, in his Poetry and Pragmatism, says that the "vagueness is a 
function of sound, of the way the inflected sounds of words is manipulated 
so as to take the edge off words them*selves, to blur and refract them. The 
sounds we will be attending to allow for the most easygoing sort of 
utterance, Iike the ambling dialogue of Melanctha and Jeff in Stein's Three 
Lives. It is as if the voice is idling, apparently not headed anywhere in 
particular. The sounds are often untraslatable into rational discourse, or 
are at least badly served by it."7 Poirier calls the vagueness of poetic 
language "deconstructive movements of language" from a pragmatic point of 
view. 
J. Hillis Miller says in his Fiction aud Repetition, " [any] novel is a 
complex tissue of repetitions and of repetitions within repetitions, or of 
repetitions linked in chain fashion to other repetitions."8 Lacan, Deleuze, 
Del~rida, Benjamin, Georges Poulet have also theorized repetition various 
ways. 
The interesting point is that Melanctha's story begins and ends with 
her relationship to Rose. Stein creates these two women as opposite 
characters in their characteristics. Rose reveals the other within 
Melanctha's self, paradoxically, in a frame of double, or doppelg~nger 
portraits. Melanctha Herbert is subtle, intelligent, attractive, unmarried, 
half-white, while Rose is decent, sullen, married, ordinary black, raised by a 
white family. Stein reflects this doppelg~nger strategy also in the 
relationship between Jeff Campbell and Jem Richard. They are composed as 
a completely opposite pair. Jeff represents stable, methodical, Rose-like 
characteristics. He insists on a "regular living," while Jem is a playboy and 
gambler, wandering without a job. 
The conflation of beginning and ending guarantees that the story may 
not in fact give the reader the clue or key to Melanctha's character. Instead, 
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the story becomes a performance of this character, which is represented by 
her repetitive act of "wanderings." In turn, her wanderings reflect the 
wanderings of words in repetition. 
The discourse of "Melanctha" attempts to avoid the ending by the 
repetitive act of beginning again and again with a repetitious refrain. In a 
sense, repetition, which destroys the linear progress of discourse, 
constructs a cyclical world, which is quite a postmodern strategy of fiction. 
The story is always at the beginning, or from the outset, it may begin with 
the ending. Here is Stein's idea of the continuous present. Her idea implies an 
Emersonlan "clrcle." But Steln's "clrcle" Is, In fact, not a clrcle. The 
beginning and the end are slightly different. The novella "Melanctha" begins 
as follows: 
Rose Johnson made it very hard to bring her baby to its birth. 
Melanctha Herbert who was Rose Johnson's friend, did everything that 
any woman could L . . . . J 
The child though it was healthy after it was born, did not live long. Rose 
Johnson was careless and negligent and selflsh, and when Melanctha had to 
leave for a few days, the baby died. Rose Johnson had lil{ed the baby well 
enough and perhaps she just forgot it for a while, anyway the child was dead 
and Rose and Sam her husband were very sorry but then these things came 
so often in the negro world in Bridgepoint, that they neither of them thought 
about it very long. 9 
The same discourse appears in the latter part of the text, with a slight, but 
apparent, change: 
Rose had a hard time to bring her baby to its birth and Melanctha did 
everything that any woman could. 
The baby though it was healthy after it was born did not live long. Rose 
Johnson was careless and negligent and selfish and when Melanctha had to 
leave for a few days the baby died. Rose Johnson had liked her baby well 
enough and perhaps she just forgot it for a while, anyway the c~ild was dead 
and Rose and Sam were very sorry, but then these things came so often in the 
negro world in Bridgepoint that they neither of them thought about it very 
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long.lo 
Here I would like to examine briefly Stein's concept of an endless, spiral 
shape of repetition, which is expressed in her idea of "A rose is a rose is a 
rose is a rose." 
C. "A rose is a rose is a rose is a rose" . . . 
The point is that nuanced repetition is really reiteration, in the manner 
of Stein's "A rose is a rose is a rose is a rose." When asked why she wrote 
it, Stein replied that the first rose was not the same as the second, the 
second differed from the third, and the third from the fourth. By the mere 
fact of being reiterative, with an intonation which is inevitably different, 
Stein's roses say something more: there is a supplement. 
Poirier says, in Poetry aud Pragmcbt~sm agaln that "words are the srgns 
of things" which "are the slgns of words." He asks: "Is the word 'rose' a 
sign of a flower? Yes, but it is a flower that has by now itself become a sign 
of, say, Iove or perfection or mortality or beauty, so much so that Stein 
decided at one point that we have had enough of such roses: 'rose is a rose 
is a rose is a rose.' She has no illusions that by such iteration she can 
actually make this be the case with roses; she is saying, rather, that the 
human mind, which has already made so much of roses, can also, as that 
mind now works in her, decreate and then recreate the word. And even as 
Stein is extending James's idea of 'previous truths,' she is looking past him 
to Emerson, in whose 'Self-Reliance'(as I noted nearly thirty years ago, in A 
World Elsewhere) , there is a passage on roses of which her own is a 
revision."I1 
As Poirier mentions, the concepts of William James's pluralism shares 
Stein'ries gives consequences a different emphasis. His pragmatism is based 
on the concepts of pluralism, individualism, neutralism, indeterminism, and 
"radical empiricism." For James the question of belief is performative, that 
is, belief can be an action. What is "radical emplricism"? James writes: 
Were I obliged to give a short name to the attitude in question, I should 
call it that of radical empiricism, in spite of the fact that such brief nicknames 
are nowhere more misleading than in philosophy. I say 'empiricism,' because 
it is contended to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of 
fact as hypotheses liable to modificatlon in the course of future experience; 
and I say 'radical,' because it treats the doctrine of monism itself as a 
hypothesis, ancl, unlike so much of the half-way empiricism that is current 
under the name of positivism or agnosticism or scientific naturalism, it does 
not dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all experience has 
got to square.12 
Radical empiricism conceives of life as an interwoven, interdependent 
sti-ucture that can only be grasped in its fullness by being grasped in its 
relations, or in its fluidities. Radical empiricism amounts to the fallibilist 
conviction that our most stable convictions are no more than "hypotheses 
liable to modification in the course of future experience." James indicates 
both incompleteness and imperfections. Incompleteness and imperfections 
involve another feature of Jamesian pragmatism, that is, "indeterminism." 
What is "indeterminism" in Jamesian pragmatism? He explains this 
concept in relation to another tendency of his philosophy: "Indeterminism 
thus denies the world to be one unbending unit of fact. It says there is a 
certain ultimate pluralism in it; and, so saying, it corroborates our ordinary 
unsophisticated view of things. To have view, actualities seem to float in a 
wider sea of possibilities from out of which they are chosen; and somewhere, 
indeterminism says, SLlch possibilities exists, and form a part of truth."I3 
Pragmatism pl~oposes a world of many truths rather than only one 
truth. But it is also a world in which most things are true only at very 
definite instants. This is a worlcl as James descrlbes It of "radrcal 
pluralism wlthout a sweeping outline and wlth little pictorlal nobility," a ,,, '' 
world whose order is only partial and is always being revised in response 
to what is different or other. Experience in such a world is unstable, 
chaotic, and open. 
Stein, as an avant-garde modernist, calls upon the tendency in the 
reader to deduce further unuttered infol~mation from what is an otherwise 
highly diagrammatic text. This seems to be an intention behind Stein's "A 
lose Is a l~ose is a rose is a rose" In so far as it lies behind the repetitive 
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narrative strategies. The way repetition works as it differentiates the first 
use of the word from the next use, and so on, makes the text endless. Put 
another way, the endless world represents the openness of the text. 
D. Repetition / Openness 
The openness of the text stands at a crossroad of American 
pragmatism and postmodernism, as lhab Hassan says in his essay, 
"Pragmatism, Postmodernrsm and Beyond: Toward an Open World." Hassan ?
writes: ". . . that's the 'beyond' in my tltle that s the openness I have In 
"I4 and again asserts mind when I invoke pragmatism or postmodernism ; 
,,1'. that "the new Amerrcan pragmatlsm rs a form of postmodern thought. If 
the new American pragmatism is a postmodern thought, and the openness is 
one of the characteristics held in common between pragmatism and 
postmodernism, then the openness may hold a key which opens both 
American pragmatism and postmodernism. In addition, much of the 
postmodern debate highlights the themes of difference, marginality, 
otherness, and simulation, and these themes seem to move, when they 
appear as artistic strategies, toward openness. That is what I have tried to 
examine in Stein's strategy of repetition. Her repetition represents 
endlessness, that is, openness. 
The following lines of Matei Calinescu suggests a close connection 
between openness and repetition: "Postmodernism . . . has had the merit of 
reopening for us the problem of history as a field . . . as a pl~ocess in which 
irreversibility penetrates what appears as repetition and vice versa, in 
shol~t as a multiplicity of continuous/ discontinuous knowledges. . . . " 16 
American pragmatism thinks of a world without absolute truth. Stein's 
iterative strategy as a pluralist implies a concept of chance, as James says, 
"I know that Chance means pluralism and nothing more."I7 The idea of 
chance runs through pragmatism. Peirce also insists on chance together 
with creativity and Richard Rorty asserts that "everything is contingent." 
What is "contingency" in Rorty's pragmatic view? The everyday ability 
to view our situation contingently would seem rather trivial on his account 
if it meant simply the ability to recognize that one's viewpoint is one anrong 
many which could be taken up. Rorty's principle pragmatic notion is the 
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"commonsenslcal" vlew of contlngency. In a sense, his position is 
assimilated to the commonsense perspective. After all, our everyday 
vocabulary expresses the main characteristics of liberalism. Gesturing 
towards "openness " "plurallsm " and "contlngency," Rorty approaches 
liberalism. 
In Rorty's view there is the familiar liberal reliance on the notion of 
"free choice." This seems to link him with the Emersonian pragmatic 
outlook, and with Jamesian individualism, which finds its reflection in the 
poetry of Emily Dickinson, who associates the quest for individual liberty 
with natural religion, in her poems on death. In the idea of individualism, 
pragmatism may come to terms with Jean-Francois Lyotard's disbelief of 
master narratives. 
Rorty's liberal pluralism supports the concept of contingency. His 
notion of "contingency" reveals the "plurallstlc" nature of llberal bellefs and 
convictions: 
The line of thought common to Blumenberg. Nietzsche. Freud, and Davidson 
suggests that we try to get the point whei~e we no fonger worship anything, 
where we treat nothing as a quasi divinity, where we treat everything-our 
language, our conscience, our cornmunity - as a product of time and chance. 
To reach this point would be, in Freud's words, to "treat chance as worthy of 
determining our fate." 18 
What do we make of Rcu~ty's idea that contingency is found in 
language? The contingency of language commits Rorty to the idea that truth 
Is no longer "out there" In a reallty beyond language but "In here" in the 
relations among our sentences. Rorty makes us recognize that language is a 
medium neither exactly of representation nor of expl~ession. It is rather an 
instrument of redescrilDtion. Language in this view is more like a set of 
tools for performing a task than a medium for getting something straight. In 
other words, Ianguage generates a "process" rather than an end. In this 
sense, pragmatism is interested in consequences, rather than cause and 
effect, and in the process of language. 
Pragmatism as a method does not seem to imply any final philosophical 
conclusions. Thus pragmatism can also be practically~ identified with the 
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scientific method. 
~l Chaos: An ConcluSion 
In Chaos, James Gleick documents how researchers in various fields 
became aware that others were working along similar lines and that what 
they were discovering were not aberrations but a new kind of paradigm. 
Gleick begins Chaos with a story of Edward Lorenz, a meteorologist, 
who attempted to model the earth's weather in the graphic, ~vavy, repeating 
lines of the weather patterns. Lorenz stopped a sequence in midcourse, 
rather than start over from the beginning, and typed the mid-point values 
19 into the computer to start the sequence running again. 
Lorenz presumed that this mid-point run would match the first run 
exactly. To his surprise, when he compared the two lines he found that they 
diverged--at first only a little, but then more and more. 
A minute difference in the initial conditions in the Lorenz story finds 
an analogy in Stein's concept of "A rose is a rose is a rose is a rose," where 
the first rose is slightly different from the second which is different from 
the second which is different from the third, and the fourth, in turn. The 
final result of Lorenz's research was a pattern quite different from the 
original. "Nothing ever happened the same way twice."20 
Through the example of Lorenz's scientific research, Gleick explains 
the indeterminacy of pure mathematics. Sciences have an illusion to obey 
scientific rules based on a kind of Newtonian determinism. Yet, as 
Einstein's relativity and Heisenberg's uncertainty show, the world is 
intermingled, that is, "chaotic." The interesting point is that, paradoxically, 
chaos theory arises from a simple deterministic system. 
The emergence of the idea of chaos is virtually a casebook 
demonstration that scientific investigation is not simply a matter of 
objectively describing nature. In other words, even scientific investigation 
turns out to have "indeterminancies." 
Glelck s Chaos stresses that the important idea of chaos emerged from 
the work of a few solidary individuals. Gleick writes: "No committee of 
scientists pushed histol~y into a new channel--a handful of individuals did 
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it, with individual perceptions and indivldual goals."21 In this view we may 
find Emersonian and Jamesian individualism. 
After he explains the history of chaos theory, Gleick mentions at least 
three characteristics of chaos: (a) "To some physlclsts chaos Is a sclence of 
process rather than state, of becoming rather than being"; (b) "Now that 
science is looking, chaos seems to be everywhere"; and (c) "Chaos breaks 
across the lines that separates scientific disciplines."22 The characteristics 
of chaos whrch Inslst on "process," immanence, and breaking the borderline, 
can be found, I think, in postmodernism as well as in American Pragmatism. 
Charles S. Peirce says, "Chaos rs pure nothlng "23 However "chaos rs 
everywhere," according to modern scientific belief. And it is also mentioned 
by Rorty. But, firstly, to say "chaos is everywhere" itself sounds chaotic. In 
other words, to talk about chaos puts us in a chaotic condition. Secondly, if 
chaos is everywhere, it represents a face of postmodernism, that is, 
immanences. In his The Postmodern Tvtrn, Ihab Hassan points out, "two 
central, constitutive tendencies in postmodernism": one of them rs 
"immawences," the other is "il4determinacies." He neologlzes "mdetermanence " 
and explains that the term designates the two tendencies, implying 
24 ilrdetermi71;acies lodged in immanell;ces. If the tendency of immanences is so 
closely combined with the other tendency of indeterminacies so as to 
warrant the neologism, "indetermanence " the term suggests a feature of 
chaos. Or, chaos includes the meaning of "indetermanence." 
What can we learn from chaos theory? That it is "reality" itself in 
specific situations for specific purposes. Chaos theory changes our notion of 
"realrty " In other words, it reveals endless paradigm shifts. In this sense, 
chaos theory is closely related to the concept of openness. Both 
Postmodernism and American pragmatism are interested in chaos theory, 
which offers a view of "reality," one not totally ordered. 
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